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Abstract
In ACISP 2006, Peng et al proposed a novel range
test technique, which tests whether the integer en-
crypted in a ciphertext is in an interval range. Their
solution is more efficient than any previous solution
to range test. However, their technique only works
in the passive adversary model, so cannot be widely
applied. In this paper, the range test by Peng et al is
optimised to be secure in the active adversary model.
Although the new range test protocol is less efficient
than the original scheme by Peng et al, it is still an ef-
ficient solution and can be employed in a much wider
application area.
Keywords: range test, correctness, soundness, ac-
tive adversary model
1 Introduction
Peng et al (Peng, Boyd, Dawson & Okamoto 2006)
solved a cryptographic problem: range test. In a
range test, one party (the tester) holds a ciphertext
and wants to know whether the message encrypted in
the ciphertext is within a certain interval range. An-
other party, called the decryption authority, holds the
decryption key of the encryption system and is asked
to help the tester. They run an interactive protocol
to implement the range test. After the range test
protocol, the decryption authority and the tester ob-
tain no information related to the message encrypted
in the ciphertext except the test result. Range test
is useful in a wide range of cryptographic applica-
tions, where privacy of certain data must be main-
tained when they are processed. Peng et al (Peng
et al. 2006) show that it is important in applications
like electronic auction, electronic voting, electronic fi-
nance, group signature, publicly verifiable secret shar-
ing and verifiable encryption. They define security of
a range test as follows.
• Correctness: If the encrypted message is in the
interval range, the test outputs TRUE.
• Soundness: If the test outputs TRUE, the en-
crypted message is in the interval range.
• Privacy: No information about the encrypted
message is revealed except what can be deduced
from the test result.
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• Flexibility: The limitation on the range size, en-
cryption format and participants should be as
little as possible.
Peng et al (Peng et al. 2006) analyse several re-
lated techniques including zero knowledge proof of
partial knowledge by Cramer et al (Cramer, Damg˚ard
& Schoenmakers 1994), zero test by Peng et al (Peng,
Boyd, Dawson & Lee 2004), a special proof and
verification technique by Boudot (Boudot 2000) and
other schemes (Bao 1998, Mao 1998, Brickell, Chaum,
Damg˚ard & van de Graaf 1987, Chan, Frankel &
Tsiounis 1998, Peng, Boyd, Dawson & Lee 2005).
They illustrate that their technique is more advanced
than these previous techniques. Their method is sim-
ple: with the help of a second encryption system, a
range test is reduced to a specialized zero test. The
cryptographic primitive called specialized zero test in
their paper is a special two party variant of a crypto-
graphic tool called zero test in (Peng et al. 2004). A
specialized zero test allows two parties, a ciphertext
holder and a decryption key holder, to test whether
at least one zero is encrypted in multiple ciphertexts
held by the ciphertext holder where the decryption
authority holds the private key. Their range test pro-
tocol, called precise range test, perfectly achieves cor-
rectness and flexibility. As their range test is reduced
to a specialized zero test involving a small constant
number (independent of the size of the range) of ci-
phertexts, it is efficient. However, its soundness and
privacy are only achieved in the passive adversary
model. Namely, the decryption authority is assumed
not to deviate from the test protocol, which requires
a trust on the decryption authority. This drawback
greatly limits the application of their range test tech-
nique.
In this paper, cut-and-choose strategy is applied to
optimise the range test protocol by Peng et al (Peng
et al. 2006). In the optimised range test protocol, the
tester does not need to trust the decryption authority.
If the decryption authority is dishonest and deviates
from the protocol, with an overwhelmingly large prob-
ability his invalid behaviour will be detected. Thus
the optimised range test protocol is sound and private
in the active adversary model. Although the cut-and-
choose strategy leads to a trade-off between soundness
and efficiency, the optimised range test protocol is still
an efficient solution to range test.
In this paper, the following symbols are used.
• % denotes computation of remainder in a divi-
sion.
• [S] denotes the size of a set S.
•
(
a
b
)
denotes the number of possible choices of b
elements from a candidate elements.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, the range test scheme by Peng et al (Peng
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et al. 2006) is recalled and analysed. In Section 3,
an optimisation of the range test scheme by Peng et
al (Peng et al. 2006) is proposed. In Section 4, the
new range test scheme is analysed. In Section 5, the
new range test scheme is compared with the existing
solutions.
2 The Range Test Scheme by Peng et al
Two additive homomorphic semantically-secure en-
cryption systems (e.g. modified ElGamal encryption
(Lee & Kim 2002)) are employed by Peng et al (Peng
et al. 2006) in their range test where definition of ad-
ditive homomorphic semantically-secure encryption is
given as follows.
• An encryption algorithm with encryption
function E() is additive homomorphic if
E(m1)E(m2) = E(m1 + m2) for any messages
m1 and m2.
• An encryption algorithm is semantically-secure
if given a ciphertext c and two messages m1 and
m2, such that c = E(mi) where i = 1 or 2, there
is no polynomial algorithm to find out i with a
probability non-negligiblely larger than 0.5 when
the private key is unknown.
The tester holds a ciphertext in the first encryption
system and cooperates with the authority, who holds
the private key of the first encryption system. To im-
plement the range test, a second encryption system
is set up and its private key is held by the authority
as well. The public keys of both encryption systems
are public. The message spaces of the two encryption
systems are Zp1 and Zp2 respectively. It is required
that p2 ≥ 3p1 and p2 is a prime. The range involved
in the test can be any Zq with a condition 5q ≤ p1.
Peng et al (Peng et al. 2006) demonstrate that with
the help of homomorphism of the employed encryp-
tion algorithm a range test in any range containing q
consecutive integers can be reduced to a range test in
interval range Zq. As q can be very large, any inter-
val range with practical size can be handled. Given
a ciphertext c in the first encryption system, a tester
A1 has to test whether D1(c) < q with the help of
A2, the decryption authority.
Peng et al (Peng et al. 2006) firstly propose a pro-
totype protocol called basic range test implemented
as follows where appropriate modulus dependent on
the concrete encryption algorithm is used in every
multiplication operation.
1. A1 randomly choosesm1 from Zp1 . He calculates
c1 = E1(m1) and sends c2 = c/c1 to A2.
2. A2 calculates m2 = D1(c2), c
′
2 = E2(m2) and
e2 = E2(m2%q). He then sends c
′
2 and e2 to A1.
3. A1 calculates c
′
1 = E2(m1) and e1 = E2(m1%q).
He then performs a specialized zero test:
ZM ( A1, A2 | e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q)), (1)
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q − q)),
e1e2/(c
′
1c
′
2E2(p1%q + q)) )
between A1, the ciphertexts holder, and A2, the
decryption authority. A specialized zero test
ZM(c1, c2, . . . , cn) checks whether at least one
zero is encrypted in c1, c2, . . . , cn and is imple-
mented in Figure 1.
1. A1 chooses pi(), a permutation of
{1, 2, . . . , n}, and random integers ri
from Zp2{0} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then he
calculates c′i = c
ri
pi(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. He
sends c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n to A2.
2. A2 calculates di = D2(c
′
i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
one by one until one di is found to be zero
or all the n ciphertexts are decrypted. He
outputs TRUE iff a zero is found in his de-
cryption.
Figure 1: Specialized zero test
A basic range test involving ciphertext c, tester
A1 and decryption authority A2 is denoted as
BR ( A1, A2 | c ). Peng et al (Peng et al. 2006)
prove that when the number of zeros encrypted in
the tested integers is smaller than 2, specialized zero
test does not reveal any information about the inte-
gers except whether there is a zero encrypted in them.
As the employed encryption algorithms are semanti-
cally secure and among the five ciphertexts involved
in (1) at most one of them can contain a zero, basic
range test is private when it is strictly carried out.
It is straightforward that it is correct. However its
soundness is incomplete and it can only guarantee
that D1(c) < 3q. To solve this problem, Peng et al
(Peng et al. 2006) propose their final solution, precise
range test PR ( A1, A2 | c ), described as follows.
1. A1 communicates with A2 to perform two ba-
sic range tests, BR ( A1, A2 | c ) and
BR ( A1, A2 | E1(q − 1)/c ), in a random or-
der.
2. A2 finishes the two basic range tests and outputs:
PR (A1, A2 | c ) =


TRUE if BR ( A1, A2|
c ) = TRUE and
BR ( A1, A2 |
E1(q − 1)/c )
= TRUE
FALSE otherwise
Peng et al (Peng et al. 2006) prove that when
A2 does not deviate from the precise range test
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) = TRUE iff D1(c) < q. They
also prove that when A2 does not deviate from the
precise range test it is private and does not reveal
any information about the secret message in c to any
one except the test result. However, there is a draw-
back in the range test technique by Peng et al (Peng
et al. 2006). As the decryption authority is assumed
not to deviate from the precise range test, their test is
only secure in the passive adversary model. In their
test protocol, the decryption authority, A2 must be
trusted to be honest. Although A1 as a tester must
hope the protocol is strictly followed such that he can
get the correct result, A2 does not necessarily think
in the same way. A2 may cheat and lead the test pro-
tocol to a wrong result and thus their test protocol
is not sound. Moreover, A2 may replace his correct
inputs with other inputs specially designed to obtain
information about the secret message and thus com-
promise privacy of the test protocol.
3 Optimized Range Test
In this section, the precise range test by Peng et al
(Peng et al. 2006) is optimized to be secure in the
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1. A1 chooses a security parameter t and ran-
domly divides set {1, 2, . . . , 2t} into four
subsets S1, S2, S3 and S4, such that [S1] +
[S2] = [S3]+ [S4] = t. He keeps this division
secret.
2. A1 randomly chooses m from Zq, calcu-
lates cˆ = E1(m) and E1(0), a probabilis-
tic encryption of zero. Then he repeats for
i = 1, 2, . . . , 2t.
• if i ∈ S1, A1 performs V Ci =
PR ( A1, A2 | cˆ ) with A2;
• if i ∈ S2, A1 performs V Ci =
PR ( A1, A2 | E1(0)/cˆ ) with A2;
• if i ∈ S3, A1 performs V Ci =
PR ( A1, A2 | c ) with A2;
• if i ∈ S4, A1 performs V Ci =
PR ( A1, A2 | E1(0)/c ) with A2.
3. A1 recognises A2’s honesty if and only if
V Ci = TRUE for i ∈ S1, V Ci = FALSE
for i ∈ S2, V Ci is identical for i ∈ S3, V Ci
is identical for i ∈ S4 and V Ci = ¬V Cj for
i ∈ S3 and j ∈ S4. If A2 is verified to be
honest, A1 accepts V Ci with i ∈ S3 as the
test result.
Figure 2: Optimized range test
active adversary model instead of only in the passive
adversary model. In the passive adversary model, an
adversary in a protocol may be curious and try to
get information not supposed to be known by him,
but he will not deviate from the protocol. It is also
called honest-but-curious model. In the active adver-
sary model, an adversay in a protocol not only may
be curious but also may deviate from the protocol.
In the optimized range test A1 employs a cut-and-
choose mechanism to verify correctness of A2’s opera-
tion. This cut-and-choose mechanism can also achieve
complete privacy against A2. Multiple precise range
tests of c are randomly mixed with multiple precise
range tests of another random ciphertext. Only A1
knows which precise range tests are performed on c,
while A2 cannot distinguish any test from other tests.
If A2 attempts to cause an incorrect result, with the
help of the cut-and-choose mechanism A1 can detect
A2’s cheating with an overwhelmingly large probabil-
ity. The optimized range test protocol is described
in Figure 2, which guarantees that the tester can al-
ways get the correct test result if he wants even in the
active adversary model.
4 Analysis
Properties of the optimised range test is analysed in
this section.
Theorem 1 The probability that a cheating A2 can
pass the verification in the optimized range test is no
more than 1/
(
2t
t
)
.
Proof: Let vci denote the result of the i
th precise
range test when A2 acts honestly. Let CS = {i | 1 ≤
i ≤ 2t, V Ci = vci}. No matter how A2 cheats, his
malicious behaviour can be classified into three cases:
[CS] < t, t < [CS] < 2t or [CS] = t. In the following,
these three cases are analysed respectively.
• If [CS] < t, V Ci = TRUE for i ∈ S1 and V Ci =
FALSE for i ∈ S2 cannot be satisfied. So A1 fails
in the verification and A2 is found cheating.
• If t < [CS] < 2t, either incorrect precise range
test exists in V Ci for i ∈ S1 ∪ S2 or both correct
and incorrect precise range tests exist in V Ci for
i ∈ S3 ∪ S4. So A1 fails in the verification and
A2 is found cheating.
• If [CS] = t, A2 can pass the verification if and
only if CS = S1 ∪ S2. As A1 keeps his divi-
sion of the four sets secret and the employed en-
cryption algorithms are semantically secure, A2
cannot tell any difference between the multiple
precise range tests in polynomial time. More-
over, S1, S2, S3, S4 are randomly chosen and
{vc1, vc2, . . . , vc2t} are uniformly distributed in
{TRUE,FALSE}2t. So A2 has no better method
to find S1 ∪S2 other than random guess. There-
fore, the probability that CS = S1∪S2 is 1/
(
2t
t
)
.
Therefore, the only method for a cheating A2 to pass
the verification is to set CS = S1 ∪ S2, the success
probability of which is 1/
(
2t
t
)
. 2
Theorem 1 indicates that if he wants the tester
can always get the correct test result in the optimized
precise range test with an overwhelmingly large prob-
ability even in the active adversary model.
Theorem 2 The optimised range test is private.
Proof: As the employed encryption algorithms are
semantically secure and A1 knows no private key, the
only knowledge he gets in the optimized range test
is the results of the 2t precise range tests if A2 does
not collude with him. As the results of the 2t precise
range tests only contain the range test result of D1(c)
and information about another message chosen by
A1, A1’s only knowledge about D1(c) is the test
result. A2’s knowledge from each precise range test is
only the test result without A1’s collusion. If A1 does
not collude with him, A2’s knowledge transcript in
each precise range test is independently distributed.
So if A1 does not collude with him, A2’s knowledge
about D1(c) in the optimized precise range test is
the results of the 2t precise range tests, which are
indistinguishable from each other. Therefore, A2’s
only knowledge about D1(c) is the test result. 2
The optimised range test protocol is flexible as
it supports any additive homomorphic semantically-
secure encryption, accepts ranges of the same magni-
tude as the size of the message space of the encryption
algorithm and does not need any prover with knowl-
edge of the encrypted message. Although the cut-
and-choose mechanism reduces efficiency, cost of the
optimized range test is still independent of the range
size. As the cutting factor t (which is a small con-
stant number like 20) is often much smaller than the
range size, the optimized range test is still an efficient
solution. So the optimized range test can satisfy all
the desired properties of range test.
5 Comparison
The advantages of the new range test protocol over
the existing related schemes in terms of the desired
properties and efficiency are demonstrated in Table 1.
In the comparison, cost of general and flexible range
tests instead of more efficient range tests with special
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encryption format for certain special application are
listed. It is clearly demonstrated that the new scheme
achieves all the desired properties of range test and is
efficient.
The range test technique by Peng et al (Peng
et al. 2006) only secure in the passive adversary model
is optimised in this paper to be secure in the active
adversary model. The new scheme achieves all the
desired properties of range test and is efficient.
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